Despite provable unknowables in recursion theory, indeterminism and randomness in physics is confined to conventions, subjective beliefs and preliminary evidence. The history of the issue is very briefly reviewed, and answers to five questions raised by Zenil are presented.
axiom of choice) is random in the sense of algorithmic information theory [5, 6, 7] ; i.e., in terms of algorithmic incompressibility as well as of the equivalent statistical tests. Indeed, if one encodes universal computation into a system on n bodies, then by reduction to the halting problem of recursion theory [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , certain observables become provable unknowable [14] .
A second attack against determinism erupted through the development of quantum theory. Despite fierce resistance of Einstein 2 , Schrödinger and De Brogli, Born expressed the new quantum canon, repeated by the "mainstream" ever after [16] , as follows (cf. Ref. [17, p. 866] , English translation in [18, p. 54] ) 3 :
"From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity which in any individual case causally fixes the consequence of the collision; but also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that there are some inner properties of the atom which condition a definite outcome for the collision. "The motion of particles conforms to the laws of probability, but the probability itself 2 In a letter to Born In addition to the indeterminism associated with outcomes of the measurements of single quanta, there appear to be at least two other types of quantum unknowables. One is complementarity, as first expressed by Pauli [21, p. 7] . A third type of quantum indeterminism was discovered by studying quantum probabilities, in particular the consequences of Gleason's theorem [22] :
whereas the classical probabilities can be constructed by the convex sum of all two-valued measures associated with classical truth tables, the elementary yes-no propositions in quantum mechanics associated with projectors in three-or higher-dimensional Hilbert spaces do not allow any two-valued measures [23, 24] . One of the consequences thereof is the impossibility of a consistent co-existence of the outcomes of all conceivable quantum observables (under the noncontextuality assumption [25] that measurement outcomes are identical if they "overlap").
Parallel to these developments in physics, Gödel [26] put an end to finitistic speculations in mathematics about possibilities to encode all mathematical truth in a finite system of rules. The recursion theoretic, formal unknowables exhibit a novel feature: they present provable unknowables in the fixed axiomatic system in which they are derived. (Note that incompleteness and undecidability exist always relative to the particular formal system or model of universal computation.) From ancient times onwards, individuals and societies have been confronted with a pandemonium of unpredictable behaviors and occurrences in their environments, sometimes resulting in catastrophes. Often these phenomena were interpreted as "God's Will." In more rationalistic times, one could pretend without presenting a formal proof that certain unpredictable behaviors are in principle deterministic, although the phenomena cannot be predicted "for various practical purposes." Now provable unknowables make a difference by being immune to these kinds of speculation. The halting problem in particular demonstrates the impossibility to predict the behavior of deterministic systems in general; it also solves the induction (rule inference) problem to the negative.
In order to be able to fully appreciate the impact of recursion theoretic undecidability on physics [27, 28, 29] , let us sketch an algorithmic proof of the undecidability of the halting problem; i.e., the decision problem of whether or not a program p (on a finite input) finishes running (or will reach a particular halting state) or will run forever. The proof method will use a reductio ad absurdum; i.e., we assume the existence of a halting algorithm h(p) deciding the halting problem of p, as well as some trivial manipulations; thereby being able to derive a complete contradiction, the only consistent alternative being the nonexistence of any such halting algorithm. For the sake of contradiction, consider an agent q(p) accepting as input an arbitrary program (code) p. Suppose further that it is able to consult a halting algorithm h(p), thereby producing the opposite behavior of p: whenever p halts, q "steers itself" into the halting mode; conversely, whenever p does not halt, q forces itself to halt. A complete contradiction results from q's behavior on itself, because whenever q(q) detects (through h(q)) that it halts, it is supposed not to halt; conversely if q(q) detects that it does not halt, it is supposed to halt. Finally, since all other steps in this "diagonal argument" with the exception of h are trivial, in order to avoid inconsistencies, no program can have the capacity to consult a halting algorithm for arbitrary programs.
In physics, analogous arguments embedding a universal computer into a physical substrate yield provable undecidable observables via reduction to the halting problem [30] . Note that this argument does not mean that predictions are provable impossible for certain special cases; that would be clearly misleading and absurd! A more quantitative picture arises if we study the potential growth of "complexity" of deterministic systems in terms of their maximal capability to "grow" before reaching a halting state through the Busy Beaver function [31, 32, 33, 34] . Another consequence is the recursive unsolvability of the general induction (or rule inference [35, 36, 37, 38, 39] ) problem for deterministic systems. As an immediate consequence of these findings it follows that no general algorithmic rule or operational method [40] exists which could "extract" some rather general law from a (coded) sequence. (Note again that it still may be possible to extract laws from "low-complex" sequences; possibly with some intuition and additional information.) Nor can there be certainty that some sequence denominated "random" is not generated by a compression algorithm which makes it formally nonrandom [6] ; a fact well known in recursion theory but hardly absorbed by the physics community. Thereby, to quote Shakespeare's Prospero, any claims of absolute ("ontological") randomness decay into "thin air." Of course, one could still vastly restrict the domain of possible laws and define a source to be random if it "performs well" with respect to the associated, very limited collection of statistical tests, a strategy adapted by the Swiss Federal Office of Metrology 5 .
Despite the formal findings reviewed above, which suggest that claims of absolute indetermi- For the sake of explicit demonstration, let us consider a particular method of generation of a sequence from single quantum outcomes [41] by combination of source and beam splitter [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50] . Ideally (to employ quantum complementarity as well as quantum value indefiniteness), a system allowing three or more outcomes is prepared to be in a particular pure state "contained" in a certain context (maximal observable [51] or block [52, 53] ), and then measured "along" a different context not containing the observable corresponding to that pure state. All outcomes except two are discarded [6, 54] , and the two remaining outcomes are mapped onto the symbols "0" and "1," respectively. The concatenation and normalization [55, 56, 57, 58, 59] of subsequent recordings of these encoded outcomes yield an "absolutely random sequence" relative to the unprovable axiomatic assumption of quantum randomness.
Since all such operational physical sequences are finite, algorithmic information theory [6] applies to them in a limited, finite sense. Particular care should be given to the difficulties in associating an algorithmic information measure to "nontrivial" sequences of finite length.
In the author's conviction, the postulate of quantum randomness as well as physical randomness emerging from the continuum will be maintained by the community of physicists at large unless somebody comes up with evidence to the contrary. This opportunistic interpretation of the phenomena appears reasonable if and only if researchers are aware of the tentativeness and conventionality of their assumptions.
